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UNDERHILL MOORE'S LEGAL SCIENCE: 
ITS NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE 
F. S. C. NORTHROPt 
THE legal science of Underhill Moore was the product of the two 
major movements of moder legal thought: legal realism and sociolog- 
ical jurisprudence. It demonstrates both the strength and the limita- 
tions of these two legal theories. His work had this somewhat paradoxi- 
cal character because he substituted scientifically exact methods and 
deeds for the vivid but unverifiable, pseudo-descriptive prose in which 
these two movements had all too often been previously expressed. 
When this was done the actual capability of a legal science grounded in 
a realistic application of scientific methods to social and legal facts was 
revealed to be quite different from what many earlier proponents had 
claimed. Consequently, more than anyone else Underhill Moore 
demonstrated precisely what legal realism and sociological jurispru- 
dence as traditionally conceived can and cannot do. And for this reason 
his work probably marks not merely the culmination of the jurispru- 
dence of the recent past but also a turning point in legal science gen- 
erally. It is as important, therefore, as a clue to the legal science of the 
immediate future as it is to an estimation of the remarkable original 
contributions of Underhill Moore to legal and social science that we 
become clear about the aim, the method and the results of the unique 
sociology of law which he created and applied. 
The aim and the method of Underhill Moore's legal science are in- 
separable. This is the case because his aim was to provide legal realism 
and sociological jurisprudence with a rigorous scientific method. 
Thereby he hoped to achieve at least the beginnings of a dependable 
legal science adequate to the changing and novel legal and social 
problems of our time. 
The method which he chose was that of natural science applied to 
social and legal facts. In making this choice he was but following the 
generally accepted claim of most legal realists and social scientists.1 
The general conception was that the traditional legal and social sciences 
were inadequate because previous thinkers had trusted to formal logic 
applied to the abstract nouns of propositions purporting to describe 
"the law." This situation, they thought, would be put right when legal 
and social scientists became realistic and scientific about the concrete 
facts and concrete changing systems of their subject-matter in the 
t Sterling Professor of Philosophy and Law, Yale Law School. 
The author is indebted to the Viking Fund for a grant which made this and other 
research in this field possible. 
1. Some legal realists, such as Professor Karl N. Llewellyn, never claimed that 
legal realism could resolve normative problems in law. 
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same manner that the natural scientists had become realistic and 
scientific with respect to theirs. For example, Ehrlich in his chapter 
on "The Methods of the Sociology of Law" wrote: "And sociology .. . 
including the sociology of law must be a science of observation." 2 
Little, however, did the legal realists and sociological jurists realize 
what they were being let in for when Underhill Moore took them thus 
at their word. For Underhill Moore was not so naive as to suppose 
that everyone knows what the methods of natural science are. He 
refused to indulge in the vivid extemporized prose of a Thurman 
Arnold or the intuitive literary description of a Veblen. And much as 
he admired the aim of the sociological jurisprudence of Ehrlich and 
Pound, he became suspicious of their method because of its too fre- 
quent reliance on books about past societies rather than direct observa- 
tion of a present one. 
The two-fold program which Underhill Moore launched at first 
amused his fellow realists and sociological jurists, impressing them as 
trivial. But when its import became more evident, it struck them as 
almost a betrayal of his professional class. First, he made a study of 
the specific methods of natural science to find out what they were when 
successful as with Galilei and Newton. Then he applied these specific 
methods, not to the unobservable ancient Greeks and Romans, or to 
the equally unobservable inner urges of present judges in courts of 
lower jurisdiction, or even to the sex life of distant contemporary 
savages, but to the social and legal behavior of human beings in the 
New Haven community whom he and his colleagues could see with 
their own eyes. If, as sociological jurisprudence asserts, law is to find 
its basis in social science, then, said he, in deed as well as in word, we 
must be sure that the methods of this sociology of law are scientific. 
And he added, if jurisprudence is to be realistic, let its realism be that 
of plain concrete social and legal facts which are right before our eyes 
and which anyone can get at. One of the ways in which he put this 
view into practice was to make a rigorously objective observation of 
car parking and traffic under police regulations on specific, carefully 
selected streets and street intersections a few blocks from the Yale 
Law School in New Haven, Connecticut. 
There was more even than straight-forward common sense behind 
this approach. He had not studied and reflected upon the specific 
procedure of Galilei and Newton in natural science to no avail. Galilei 
founded moder physics by beginning with the simplest case he could 
find, namely, a ball let fall freely from one's hand to the floor. Never- 
theless, by his study of this simplest case of mechanical motion, Galilei 
discovered and later, in the famous inclined plane experiment, verified 
the basic concept of force upon which moder physics rests and from 
2. EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 473 (1936). 
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which Newton's two universal laws governing all mechanical motion, 
however complicated, derive.3 Furthermore, by the formal logical 
methods of deductively formulated scientific theory, Newton in his 
famous Principia proved that with slight additions and generalizations 
the basic concepts and universal principles which Galilei discovered 
through the study of a commonplace simple motion were able to ac- 
count for the complicated motions not merely of the projectile and the 
pendulum but also of the gyroscope and even of the stars and planets 
in their courses. Moreover, Ehrlich in his specification of the methods 
of sociological jurisprudence held up the economic science of Boehm- 
Bawerk as a model and noted favorably that it is deductively formu- 
lated and based upon facts "from common everyday life as it presents 
itself to every one of us." 4 Thus, instead of pursuing the trivial in his 
studies of commonplace social phenomena, Underhill Moore was fol- 
lowing the very method prescribed by one of the main founders of the 
sociology of law. It is in simple situations often that one finds the key 
factors and relations of a science. 
Having reflected on facts such as these Underhill Moore knew that 
this was a sound procedure for a lasting solution of even the wider 
national and international social and legal questions which absorbed 
the interest of his colleagues. It was by no means trivial to seek, by 
observations and experiments repeatable by anybody, for the key con- 
cepts and principles involved in the simplest and most commonplace 
instance of a socio-legal phenomenon he could find. Hence, his parking 
and traffic studies. 
Underhill Moore's study of the specific method of natural science 
made him aware of one other fact. Every empirical natural science 
passes through two stages involving quite different scientific methods. 
The first stage is appropriately called the natural history stage; the 
second, the stage of deductively formulated, indirectly and experi- 
mentally verified theory. The excessively inductive, largely descrip- 
tive physics of Aristotle illustrates the first stage. The deductively 
formulated, indirectly and experimentally verified physics of Newton's 
Principia illustrates the second stage.5 
In the early natural history stage of an empirical science the premium 
is upon determining the facts of one's subject-matter. Hence the 
scientific methods of this stage are the inductive methods of observa- 
tion, description and classification, where the concepts used in the 
description and classification get their meanings denotatively and in- 
ductively from directly observable entities and properties. To these 
methods there is added in this stage the methods formulated by Mill 
3. MACH, THE SCIENCE OF MECHANICS 30 et seq. (1919). 
4. EHRLICH, op. cit. supra note 2, at 473. 
5. Cf. NORTHROP, THE LOGIC OF THE SCIENCES AND THE HUMANITIES, CC. III, IV, 
VI (1947). 
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for determining piecemeal, causal sequence of the type described by 
Hume and illustrated in the common sense experience of lightning and 
thunder. The science of this earlier natural history stage is necessary 
as a preliminary for further advance and is reasonably adequate de- 
scriptively; but precisely for this reason it merely tells us what the 
facts are withollt giving the general basic concepts and universal prin- 
ciples in terms of which they can be understood and systematically 
related. Furthermore, it lacks systematic or structural predictive 
power from tht present to the future. It is to overcome these weak- 
nesses that natural science passes on from the descriptive inductive 
methods of the natural history stage to the deductive and experimental 
methods of indirectly verified, deductively formulated theory.6 
By the systematic or structural predictive power mentioned above, 
which experimentally verified, deductively formulated scientific theory 
alone makes possible but does not guarantee, is meant a predictive 
power such as occurs in the deductively formulated physics of Newton, 
Maxwell, Einstein or Schrbdinger. In such a scientific theory a few 
basic concepts designating independent variables define the struc- 
ture which is the state of the system at any time in such a way that 
given the postulates of the theory and the operational definitions which 
permit today's empirical values of the independent variables to be 
determined, the empirical values defining the structure of the system 
at any specified time in the future can be deduced.7 It is to be noted 
that predictive power of this systematic structural type, which only 
experimentally verified, deductively formulated scientific theory is ca- 
pable of giving, is quite different from either (a) the relatively weak ex- 
trapolation into the future of inductively gathered empirical curves 
illustrated in Gallup poll statistics, or (b) the piecemeal predictive 
power of Mill's inductive methods, both of which belong to the 
natural history stage of empirical science. As the physicist Henry 
Margenau has written, "Causality [is] not . .. a regularity describ- 
ing sense impressions or inherent in them. ... Ordinary mechanics 
would not be a causal theory if states were defined in terms of color 
and sizes. . . . To speak of sensed nature as being causal or non- 
causal has no significance whatever .... Causality therefore has 
meaning only when applied to . . . theories." 8 
It has been necessary to go into these methodological distinctions 
6. Id. at 116. 
7. Cf. LINDSAY & MARGENAU, FOUNDATIONS OF PHYSICS 99 and c. X (1936); 
MARGENAU, Meaning and Scientific Status of Causality, 1 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 133 
(1934); NORTHROP, THE LOGIc OF THE SCIENCES AND THE HUMANITIES, C. XII (1947). 
8. Metaphysical Elements in Physics, 13 REVIEWS OF MODERN PHYSICS, 177, 187 
(1941). See also NORTHROP, THE LOGIC OF THE SCIENCES AND THE HUMANITIES (1947) ; 
Lasswell & McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the 
Public Interest, 52 YALE L. J. 203-95 (1943). 
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because otherwise neither the importance of, nor the scientific reasons 
for Underhill Moore's specific method in legal and social science can be 
understood. Nor will one appreciate the difficulties and the probably 
insuperable limitations of a legal realism or sociological jurisprudence 
which restricts itself to the application of even the most effective meth- 
ods of natural science to social and legal facts. The heart of the matter 
can be put as follows: A legal realism and sociological jurisprudence 
which is adequate to the social and legal needs of the contemporary 
world must be one which can adjudicate between conflicting present 
economic, political, social and legal norms and also specify a scien- 
tifically verified new norm. For certainly the basic social and legal 
problems of the contemporary world, domestic as well as international, 
are inescapably ideological and normative in character. Different 
nations have different social and legal codes. Also, within any nation 
the old codes are proving to be inadequate for resolving the inescapable 
problems of an increasingly technological society in an atomic age. A 
legal science which is of any positive use must be able to specify new 
norms to replace the old. Such a legal realism and sociological juris- 
prudence must be one which has systematic or structural predictive 
power from the present state of society to the future. The piecemeal 
predictive power of Mill's inductive methods and of inductively gath- 
ered statistical curves extrapolated into the future will not do for the 
reason that, according to sociological jurisprudence, legal codes and 
social norms when effective must reflect what Ehrlich called "the 
inner order," 9 and what Underhill Moore termed "the group habits" 10 
or "the high frequency behavior" of men in society.11 This means that 
legal and social norms have their basis, according to sociological juris- 
prudence, not in any piecemeal factor but in the systematic relational 
or structural factor in society.12 Consequently, only a legal and social 
science which has systematic or structural predictive power from to- 
day's "inner order of society" to tomorrow's, can give today the new 
norms necessary to replace the outmoded and crumbling legal codes 
and norms of the present status quo. This only an experimentally veri- 
fied, deductively formulated social and legal science has the possibility, 
even though not the guarantee, of doing. Hence an adequate social 
science and sociological jurisprudence must be of this type. It was the 
genius of Underhill Moore to have seen this and to have gone about the 
9. EHRLICH, op. cit. supra note 2, at cc. II, III. 
10. Moore, Rational Basis of Legal Institutions, 23 COL. L. REV. 609, 613 (1923). 
11. Moore & Hope, An Institutional Approach to the Law of Commercial Banking, 
38 YALE L.J. 703, 705 (1929). 
12. Even in 1929 in the imperfect initial formulation of the method of his legal science, 
Underhill Moore in conjunction with Theodore S. Hope, Jr. wrote: "The subject of the 
proposed study is human behavior. The study proposed is a systematic study." Moore 
& Hope, supra note 11, at 705. 
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unconventional and painstaking, laborious task of attempting to 
achieve it. The beginnings were made in 1929 in a preliminary way in 
what he termed "the choice and logical elaboration of categories and 
sub-categories," 13 and carried forward on more rigorous foundations 
through 1943 when he completed his final great work in conjunction 
with Charles C. Callahan.14 
He had found when he turned to sociology that no such deductively 
formulated sociology existed. Existing sociology is still for the most 
part in the inductive, descriptive, Gallup poll statistics, natural history 
stage. The last attempt at a deductively formulated, experimental 
sociology was made by Pareto.15 It ended in failure because too many 
of Pareto's key variables were located, after the manner of the inner 
urges of the judges of gastronomical jurisprudence and of Freudian 
psychology, in the inner instincts and introspective interiors of the 
ancient Greeks and Romans or of contemporary American magistrates 
where no one could determine whether they existed or not.16 Hence, 
Underhill Moore had no alternative but to attempt the foundation of a 
new experimentally verified, deductively formulated sociology as well 
as a new sociology of law. For this reason his work is as novel and 
important for sociologists generally as it is for students of law. 
To be aware of the aforementioned causes of the failure of Pareto's 
sociology and the similar weakness of gastronomical jurisprudence is 
to understand why Underhill Moore chose the basic concepts and 
postulates of the behavioristic psychology of his Yale colleague, Pro- 
fessor Clark Hull,17 as the basis for his new social and legal science. 
Being behavioristic it provided propositions capable of verification by 
observable operations which were repeatable by anyone. Imaginative 
speculations about the inner urges and frustrations of judges were no 
longer necessary. It also avoided the intuitive judgments which the 
earlier method of his commercial banking studies was found to entail.18 
Moreover, the psychology of Professor Hull offered another advantage. 
It provided a generalization of the assumptions of the earlier behav- 
iorism which permitted an inclusion of the verifiable portion of the 
very suggestive Freudian theory. And most important of all this 
psychology was not merely indirectly and experimentally verifiable 
13. Id. at 705-6. 
14. Moore & Callahan, Law and Learning Theory: A Study in Legal Control, 53 
YALE L.J. 1 (1944). 
15. PARETO, TRAITi DE SOCIOLOGIE GENERALE (1917). For English translation from 
the later Italian edition (1923) see 1 PARETo, THE MIND AND SOCIETY (Livingston's ed. 
1935). 
16. See NORTHROP, THE LOGIC OF THE SCIENCES AND THE HUMANITIES, c. XV (1947). 
17. HULL, PRINCIPLES OF BEHAVIOR (1943). 
18. Moore & Hope, supra note 11, at 719; Moore & Sussman, Legal and Institutional 
Methods Applied to the Debiting of Direct Discounts-II: Institutional Method, 40 YALE 
L. J. 555, 1220-21 and especially 1228-32 (1932). 
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but also deductively formulated.l9 In fact the deductive formulation 
was rigorous, having been done in considerable part in the exact sym- 
bolism of mathematical logic by Professor Frederic B. Fitch.20 This 
gave Underhill Moore's social and legal science precisely the method- 
ological character and content which were needed. He had a scientific 
method which was objective and which had the deductively formulated 
character which is the necessary if not the sufficient condition for the 
prediction of the future living law and the new norms or positive law 
corresponding to it. 
This happy good fortune was not the arbitrary result of local cir- 
cumstances. There are reasons quite apart from the recourses of the 
Yale community in Underhill Moore's time for choosing psychological 
concepts as the basis of social and legal theory. Society is the product 
of the activity of human beings. Also modem neo-classical economic 
science of the Austrian school is deductively formulated and its con- 
cepts are those of psychology derived from the British empirical phi- 
losophy of Hume and Bentham. And as was noted previously, it was 
precisely this particular economic science which Ehrlich set as a model 
for the sociology of law. 
One assumption of Underhill Moore's legal science, as built upon 
Professor Hull's behavioristic psychology, is very important: namely, 
that all legal and social behavior is a response to a stimulus only and 
never the response to the meaning of the cue or mark which is the 
stimulus. "A proposition of law," he and Professor Callahan wrote, 
"is nothing more than a sensible object which may arouse a drive and 
cue a response." 21 This assumption also explains in part, but, as we 
shall see shortly, only in part, why a "distinguished authority on Bills 
and Notes" is described by Professors Lasswell and McDougal as in- 
sisting that "a teacher who expresses a social preference in the class- 
room should be fired." 22 If meanings have no part in legal and social 
science, then meaningfully and symbolically designated norms and 
preferences for such norms should have no place in the discourse of a 
professor of legal science. 
The point of the latter conclusion is not that Underhill Moore sup- 
posed social and legal problems could be solved without assumptions 
concerning norms or values. He had the most serious interest in the 
attempt of the present writer to specify 23 and apply 24 the new method, 
19. HULL, HOVLAND, Ross, HALL, PERKINS & FITCH, MATHEMATICO-DEDUCTIVE 
THEORY OF ROTE LEARNING (1940). 
20. Id. at 309-26. Recently Professor Fitch and Gladys Berry obtained a more com- 
plete formulation, Towards a Formalization of Hull's Behavior Theory, to be published 
in PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE (summer, 1950). 
21. Moore & Callahan, supra note 14, at 3. 
22. Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 8, at 205 n. 7. 
23. NORTHROP, THE LOGIC OF THE SCIENCES AND THE HUMANITIES, C. XXI (1947); 
Northrop, Jurisprudence in the Law School Curriculum, 1 J. LEG. ED. 482 (1949). 
24. NORTHROP, THE MEETING OF EAST AND WEST (1946). See also Pound, Toward 
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supplementing the methods of traditional legal realism and sociological 
jurisprudence, for determining social norms and solving normative so- 
cial and legal problems. In fact, his own research convinced him, as it 
was instrumental in convincing me, of the necessity of a new method in 
social and legal science if those disciplines are to resolve their norma- 
tive problems. The point, therefore, of his prohibition upon professors 
expressing preferences in the classroom was that until one actually 
possesses a method, such as the aforementioned, for determining new 
specific norms, as he knew very well Thomism, neo-Kantianism, neo- 
Hegelianism, legal realism and sociological jurisprudence did not 
possess, such legal teachers must be honest about what their legal 
methods and theories permit them to do. They must not in the name 
of legal realism or sociological jurisprudence give expression to norma- 
tive preferences to which the methods of these or any other of the 
traditional conceptions of legal and social science do not entitle one. 
Why did Underhill Moore conclude that the methods of legal re- 
alism and sociological jurisprudence, in which he so thoroughly be- 
lieved, were incapable of resolving normative social and legal problems? 
To answer this question, the following considerations must be clearly 
grasped. According to sociological jurisprudence, the ethical and legal 
norms for solving the disputes of society have their basis in, and if 
effective must correspond to, the de facto "inner order of society." 25 
This seems to provide a definite criterion for determining norms by the 
realistic sociological method. Actually, however, as Underhill Moore 
noted, it is as vacuous as the abstract nouns of the Austinian analytic 
jurisprudence, unless objectively valid specific operations or methods 
by which "the inner order of society" is to be determined are made 
explicit. That this had not been done becomes evident the moment one 
asks the question: How does the lawyer advising his client, or the 
judge making his decision, determine what "the living law" inner order 
of the defacto society is? 
The previous legal realism and sociological jurisprudence had tended 
to assume that one had but to recognize and direct one's attention 
toward the realistic sociological basis of legal norms to know what the 
defacto inner order of society is. As Underhill Moore put it, the judge 
or lawyer determined the inner order or high frequency institutional 
behavior of society by a single essentially introspective, intuitive 
judgment. Through a vague cultural osmosis the defacto social order 
was assumed to register itself in the introspective consciousness of 
the legally realistic judge or sociologically minded jurist. But the re- 
liability of introspective intuitive judgments as a criterion of social 
objectivity is entirely too questionable to be taken as a scientific basis 
a New Jus Gentium; Kluckhohn, The Philosophy of the Navaho Indians; Sorokin, Last- 
ing and Dying Factors in the World's Cultures; Dorsey, Two Objective Bases for a Legal 
World Order; all in IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCS AND WORLD ORDER (Northrop ed. 1949). 
25. EHRLICH, op. cit. supra note 2. 
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for legal science. Introspective intuitive judgments of objective public 
facts are notoriously relativistic and untrustworthy. Clearly a legal 
realism or sociological jurisprudence, whose explicit method for deter- 
mining the objective inner order of society is impressionistic, intro- 
spectively subjective and intuitive, is just as spurious in its objectivity 
as is gastronomical jurisprudence or the appeal to the undefined ab- 
stract nouns of the Austinian analytic jurisprudence. 
It follows, therefore, that if legal realists and sociological jurists are 
themselves to escape the subjective arbitrariness against which they 
protest when it occurs in the Austinian analytical jurisprudence, they 
must be given a more objective method for determining the inner order 
of society. Or at the very least the trustworthiness of an introspective, 
impressionistic, intuitive method must be established by a check 
against the objective evidence. 
It was this objective check which the method introduced in Underhill 
Moore's field studies of commercial banking was designed to provide. 
However, after applying this more objective method two things be- 
came evident: First, notwithstanding its careful "elaboration of cate- 
gories" and laborious gathering of data, this new method had merely 
broken up the one gross, essentially introspective, intuitive judgment 
into thirteen different similarly introspective intuitive judgments. 
Second, when he gave the objective data to experts in a bank on the 
one hand and to himself and his co-workers on the other hand and 
asked these two groups to make the thirteen intuitive judgments, there 
was in one case a difference of conclusion for four of the thirteen judg- 
ments.26 In short, even when supplemented with objective data and 
applied to a very simple social situation, the method of intuitive judg- 
ments in legal realism and sociological jurisprudence is not a trust- 
worthy means of determining the inner order of society. This conclu- 
sion becomes even more inescapable when it is noted that these intui- 
tive judgments were made not by distant judges on the bench but by 
bankers and social scientists intimately acquainted with the social 
institutions they were judging. 
Underhill Moore was forced, therefore, to conclude that the method 
of legal science must drop introspective, intuitive judgments and be- 
come completely objective. In short, legal science must base itself 
upon behavioristic rather than introspective psychology. 
It does not follow from this, as so many critics have concluded 
erroneously, that Underhill Moore's legal science and behavioristic 
psychology are invalid because they deny the existence of introspected 
impressions and the scientific validity of the introspective method. 
Underhill Moore, like Professor Hull, grants the scientific validity of 
introspective methods to give what they can give, namely subjective 
26. Moore & Sussman, supra note 18, at 1231 n.35. 
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data and impressions. He affirms also that in some instances one's 
introspected impressions of the character of the objective social order 
correspond to that objective order. But he recognizes also, as must 
everyone else, that in many cases, and as his bank credit studies demon- 
strate, even in very simple cases, one's introspected subjective impres- 
sions of the objective social order do not correspond to the objective 
order itself. In short, introspective psychological methods can give 
scientifically valid knowledge concerning what impressions a judge or 
jurist has of the objective inner order of society; they cannot, however, 
give scientifically valid knowledge of whether one's introspected sub- 
jective impression corresponds to the objective social order to which it 
purports to refer. 
To determine the objective social order itself and whether the 
latter order corresponds to one's subjective impression of it, the 
methods of behavioristic psychology are required. Since sociological 
jurisprudence would ground law not in the subjective introspection of 
what the judge or jurist believes the inner order of society to be but in 
the objective order itself, it follows, as Underhill Moore saw, that its 
method must be that of behavioristic rather than of merely introspec- 
tive psychology. 
When, however, such a behavioristically grounded, completely ob- 
jective method for legal science was constructed and applied by Under- 
hill Moore in his traffic and parking studies, two things happened with 
respect to the capacity of legal realism and sociological jurisprudence to 
formulate or resolve normative legal and social problems. These two 
results must be grasped if his judgment concerning normative prefer- 
ences by professors of law is to be understood. 
First, the acceptance of behaviorism and a completely objective 
method enforced the aforementioned thesis that "a proposition of law 
is nothing more than a sensible object which may arouse a drive and 
cue a response." This conclusion follows because the meaning of a 
sign or symbol considered as the cue to a response is knowable directly 
only by introspection. Hence, if introspective judgments are to be 
avoided in the determination of the objective social order itself, then 
the sign, or the proposition of law which is a group of signs, must be 
treated merely as a particular stimulus and never as the meaning of 
the sign or stimulus. 
This makes it very difficult even to formulate legal and social norms 
which have not yet issued in overt observable behavior. Legal realism 
and sociological jurisprudence thus find themselves confronted with a 
paradox with respect to norms. When these two theories of legal 
science use the introspective, intuitive method, they become as arbi- 
trary, subjective, relativistic and untrustworthy as the Austinian 
jurisprudence which they condemn; in short all the reasons which legal 
realists and sociological jurists give for rejecting the Austinian analytic 
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jurisprudence hold against them also. When on the other hand they 
become completely objective, as occurs in the method of Underhill 
Moore's Law and Learning Theory, the normative propositions of 
legal and social science are bereft of all meaning and function merely as 
stimuli. In short, although one obtains objectivity, the objectivity is 
that of a bare particular stimulus bereft of all meaning. 
Since Professor Clark Hull's behavioristic psychology was formu- 
lated, two very important developments have occurred in neurological 
science and behavioristic psychology. The first is the demonstration 
by Doctors Warren McCulloch and Walter Pitts 27 that the central 
nervous system of any man is so constructed that stimuli must be 
trapped in the form of preserved impulses passed around a circular 
neural net and that these persisting impulses representing past stimuli 
are the formal equivalent of universals or meanings. Furthermore, 
these representatives of meanings may fire motor neurons. In short, 
contemporary neurological science enforces the conclusion that human 
behavior is a response not merely to stimuli but also to the particular 
set of trapped representatives 28 of universals which the individual has 
selected to account for all the facts, i.e., stimuli, of his experience. In 
this sense, therefore, human behavior is a response to the equivalents 
of universals and hence a response to meanings; it is not as Underhill 
Moore assumed a mere response to stimuli. Professors Arturo Rosen- 
blueth, Norbert Wiener and Julian Bigelow have also shown 29 that a 
behavioristic mechanical system, providing it has a certain structure 
which only certain mechanical systems possess, must be a teleologically 
acting system. They have demonstrated, in addition, that the central 
nervous systems of all men possess this structure. Thus contemporary 
behavioristic psychology requires that all human beings be conceived 
as teleological systems. 
Both of the foregoing, scientific discoveries entail a modification in 
Underhill Moore's legal science. The work by Professors McCulloch 
and Pitts demonstrates that a legal science grounded in a neurological 
psychology, the method of which is completely objective, can account 
for meanings. The work of Professors Rosenblueth, Wiener and Bige- 
low demonstrates that behavioristic psychology in connection with 
such a neurology can also account for the purposeful or teleological 
activity of men. 
27. Northrop, Ideological Man in His Relation to Scientifically Known Natural Man 
in IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES AND WORLD ORDER 407 (Northrop ed. 1949) ; see also 
Rosenblueth, Wiener & Bigelow, Behavior, Purpose and Teleology, 10 PHILOS. OF SCIENCE 
18-24 (1943); WIENER, CYBERNETICS (1948). 
28. To avoid confusing worlds of discourse, the relation between a "universal" in its 
introspected manifestation and a "universal" in the discourse of neurology must be specified. 
It seems appropriate to call this relation "epistemic correlation." See NORTHROP, THE 
LoGic OF THE SCIENCES AND THE HUMANITIES, C. VII (1947). 
29. See note 27 supra. 
206 [Vol. 59:196 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.108 on Thu, 30 May 2013 16:41:12 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
UNDERHILL MOORE'S LEGAL SCIENCE 
This writer has suggested 30 that the goal in the teleologically acting 
human being may in certain instances be a group of the aforementioned 
equivalents of meanings or universals, and that when this occurs the 
behavior will be guided by ideological factors. Modification of Under- 
hill Moore's legal science, therefore, in these three directions, as re- 
quired by contemporary developments in behavioristic and neurologi- 
cal psychology, will overcome its aforementioned weakness with respect 
to the statement of norms and their significance in human and social 
behavior. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing limitations of Underhill Moore's 
thesis that a proposition in law is merely a stimulus or cue to a re- 
sponse, this assumption was not without its significance in his research. 
For even with this very weak assumption, his studies do unequivocally 
demonstrate that normative propositions and beliefs, such as a proposi- 
tion of law, make a difference in the high frequency, living law behavior 
of men in society. The difference in the distributions of parked cars 
before and after a normative legal symbol has been introduced shows 
this conclusively. The fact that in Underhill Moore's method the 
proposition of law is taken in the weakest sense possible as mere stimu- 
lus makes this result of his work all the more conclusive. 
The latter finding may seem to many people to be very trivial. Some 
have said that everyone knows this without all the labor of Underhill 
Moore's carefully controlled observations. Such a conclusion overlooks 
the fact, however, that many social scientists and countless laymen 
who follow current fashions in social science assert that norms and 
ideas merely reflect and propositionalize social facts after the event 
and in no way make social facts even in part what they are. Underhill 
Moore's findings, even on his unnecessarily weak assumption concern- 
ing the nature of a proposition of law, unequivocally give the lie to this 
prevalent notion. 
Nevertheless, even with the aforementioned required modifications 
in the basic psychological assumption of Underhill Moore's legal sci- 
ence, it is by no means evident that legal realism and sociological 
jurisprudence are thereby rendered adequate to the social and legal 
needs and problems of our time. This brings us to the second conse- 
quence of his research with respect to the specification of legal and 
social norms. This consequence had its basis in his empirical findings. 
Hence it is likely to characterize any legal realism or sociological 
jurisprudence. 
The weakness becomes evident when one turns from the problem of 
an objective method for determining today's de facto inner order of 
society and its corresponding positive law norms to the question of 
determining new norms to replace the present ones. It is to be em- 
30. See note 27 supra. 
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phasized, as Underhill Moore was very well aware, that the basic 
domestic, international and legal problems of our times are of the latter 
character. The contemporary world is characterized by the diversity 
of normative social and legal theories competing for the minds of men. 
The most vital disputes of our world are raising questions about 
whether one norm or another should be used to decide the dispute. 
Furthermore, technological discoveries, such as the method for releas- 
ing atomic energy, are rendering many present social and legal norms 
inadequate if not obsolete.31 The crucial test for legal realism and 
sociological jurisprudence comes, therefore, when we ask the question: 
Does this conception of legal science provide a method for determining 
the new norms to replace the old? Underhill Moore's research demon- 
strated that this question must be answered in the negative. 
The difficulty centers in predictive power. According to sociological 
jurisprudence, the correct normative propositions of positive law are 
those which correspond to the high frequency behavior, or what 
Ehrlich termed the living law, of defacto society. Providing, as Under- 
hill Moore's final method for legal science assures, one can obtain an 
objective determination of the high frequency behavior, or living law, 
of de facto society, sociological jurisprudence does provide a definite 
objective criterion of positive legal norms for the social status quo. 
Suppose, however, as is the case at present, not merely the positive 
law but also the underlying living law of the status quo is in question. 
Can sociological jurisprudence designate the new legal and social norms 
for judging and changing the high frequency behavior or living law of 
today's status quo? The answer is in the affirmative providing so- 
ciological jurisprudence has a scientific method and attendantly veri- 
fied, deductively formulated theory which is such that given an objec- 
tive determination of today's high frequency behavior or inner order 
of society it cannot ambiguously deduce tomorrow's. Given such a 
capacity today to deduce or predict tomorrow's living law, the socio- 
logical jurist would then merely have to write out the positive law 
norms corresponding to tomorrow's predicted living law to possess 
today the new legal norms for judging and instrumentally transforming 
not merely the positive law but also the living law of today's status quo. 






31. Northrop, Jurisprudence in the Law School Curriculum, 1 J. LEG. ED. 482 (1949). 
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where t° = the present state of the social system 
t' = a future state of the social system 
PL = the normative propositions of positive law 
LL = the living law or high frequency behavior of de facto 
society 
R = the relation of correspondence between the correct posi- 
tive legal norm and the defacto living law. 
If, given an objective determination of LL° at the present time t°, 
one's empirically verified legal science enables one to deduce LL' at 
the future time t', then sociological jurisprudence would, by merely 
writing out PL' in correspondence with the deduced LL', possess a 
method for specifying the new legal and social norm to replace the old. 
Moreover, precisely because PL' as thus knowable at the present time 
t° corresponds to a living law not yet reached in de facto society, it 
avoids the culturalistic fallacy 32 of identifying the "ought" for today's 
society with its "is." Hence, if achieved at the present time t°, PL' 
would provide a normative criterion for changing not merely the posi- 
tive law but also the living law and social and legal institutions of the 
present status quo. 
It was precisely this predictive power of PL' by way of the predic- 
tion of LL' for which Underhill Moore was seeking. Again and again 
he asserted that the basic problem of legal practice aild legal science is 
the problem of prediction.33 Considerations such as the foregoing made 
him acutely aware that unless he obtained a present prediction of the 
future living law, legal realism and sociological jurisprudence must, if 
they are scientifically honest, remain perpetually silent on normative 
issues. Without a legal science which predicts tomorrow's high fre- 
quency order of society from today's, legal realism, sociological juris- 
prudence and social science generally can say nothing about the new 
social and legal norm required to meet the new domestic and inter- 
national social problems for which the existing social practices and the 
present codified legal norms are inadequate. It can merely record and 
echo the positive law norms which correspond to the present social 
status quo. 
It has been noted earlier in this paper that a necessary condition 
for such predictive power is not merely that legal science must use an 
objective method but also that it must have a deductively formulated 
theory. It was noted also, however, that his necessary condition, which 
Underhill Moore's final formulation of legal science met, is not a 
sufficient condition for predictive power. Modern economic science is 
deductively formulated yet it does not achieve this type of predictive 
32. NORTHROP, THE MEETING OF EAST AND WEST, 212-3, 255-9 (1946), and NORTHROP, 
THE LOGIC OF THE SCIENCES AND THE HUMANITIES, 70, 279 et. seq. (1947). 
33. Moore & Hope, supra note 11, at 719; Moore & Sussman, The Lawyer's Law, 
41 YALE L.J. 566 (1932). 
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power.34 Consequently the mere fact that Underhill Moore achieved 
an objectively verifiable, deductively formulated sociology of law is 
not a guarantee that such a sociological jurisprudence will obtain the 
time-equation connecting LL°, the present inner order of society, to 
LL', the deducible future inner order of society, which is necessary if 
sociological jurisprudence is to provide any criterion of new legal codes 
and norms to replace the old. 
Underhill Moore found at the end that the application of his method 
failed to permit the deduction of tomorrow's living law from today's. 
The evidence for this conclusion came out in the following way. In his 
parking studies he made an objective determination of the distribution 
of parked cars in a given area before a given positive law regulation 
was posted. He then made a similar determination of the parking 
distribution after the positive law proposition or regulation had been 
posted. All this was done under conditions which were otherwise simi- 
lar in the two cases. At first sight the very design of the experiment 
seems to rule out any possibility of the determination of new norms. 
The experiment seemed to be testing nothing more than the change 
in the living law distribution with the introduction of a new positive 
law symbol. His experiments can be looked at from this standpoint, 
and do, as noted above, give a positive answer to the question as to 
whether the introduction of new positive law alters the living law. 
The experiment can, however, be looked at in another way and used 
to answer a different type of question. In any single study, the two 
curves representing the different distribution of parking before and 
after the posted regulation represent two different living laws. One, 
the living law, LL° at the earlier time t°; the other the living law LL' 
at the later time t'. If, therefore, by studying the relation between 
these two curves one could find an equation holding for many different 
similar studies, relating the first curve to the second, then one could 
have the aforementioned time-equation which would make it possible, 
if given an objective determination of the LL° living law of the present, 
to deduce the LL' living law of the future. 
In this connection Underhill Moore's assumption that the proposi- 
tions of the positive law function merely as stimuli and not as meanings 
was an asset rather than a liability. This assumption permitted him to 
treat the positive law symbols merely as one instance of any stimulus 
in a society which might have the effect of changing the structure of 
present society into that of the society of the immediate future. Then 
his experiment became a study in the relation joining the living law 
at one time to the living law of the same social system at a later time. 
In seeking for the mathematical formula connecting today's living 
law to tomorrow's, Underhill Moore tells us that he and his co-workers 
examined every possible empirical factor in the behavioristically con- 
34. NORTHROP, THE LOGIC OF THE SCIENCES AND THE HUMANITIES, C. XIII (1947). 
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ceived situation upon which this equation might depend. Two equa- 
tions were discovered. 
The first of these two equations defines the point at which the living 
law of the future state of the social system will begin to deviate from 
the living law of its present state. The second of the two equations 
defines the difference between the deviational part of the future state 
and the part of the earlier state from which the future state was a 
deviation. One has, therefore, but to examine these two equations in 
order to determine whether it is possible in social science, in sociology, 
and in the sociology of law to deduce the future state of the system 
from a present state. 
Such an examination shows that the future state can be deduced 
only if one knows initially not merely the living law distribution of the 
present state of the social system but also the positive law norm which 
is to be introduced. Neither of the two equations relating the future 
state of the system to the present state can be solved unless the positive 
law norm of the future state is known initially.35 Thus instead of being 
able to deduce LL' from LL° and then being free to determine the new 
legal norm by merely writing out the propositions of PL' in such a way 
that they correspond to LL', Underhill Moore's research permitted 
only the deduction of LL' if one knew at the earlier time t°, not merely 
LL°, but also PL'. Underhill Moore saw consequently that his re- 
search did not give the predictive power necessary for a handling of 
normative social and legal questions on a realistic sociological basis, 
even for the simple type of social system which he studied. 
He knew nonetheless that he had used the most powerful methods for 
deriving law from sociology by the application of the methods of nat- 
ural science to social facts which the entire armory of the weapons of 
natural science provides. He knew also that he had applied these 
most powerful methods faithfully to the simplest possible socio-legal 
system where if anywhere they should succeed. If these methods 
failed to give new normative legal and social theory in such a simple 
social situation, then the scientifically weaker natural history inductive 
methods of many of his colleagues who thought they were creating a 
new sociological jurisprudence capable of dealing with norms to succeed 
that of Underhill Moore must fail even more lamentably. 
It is to be concluded, therefore, that Underhill Moore and his legal 
science will have to be reckoned with by all subsequent social scientists 
and legal thinkers. He has given the world its first experimentally veri- 
fied, deductively formulated sociology of law. Thereby he has raised a 
legal realism and sociological jurisprudence to the greatest heights, 
both methodologically and predictively, of which they seem to be 
capable. This is the reason why he more than anyone else has shown 
what legal realism and sociological jurisprudence can and cannot do. 
35. Moore & Callahan, supra note 14, at Appendix E, pp. 130-2. 
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Underhill Moore's legal science, therefore, has demonstrated the 
three following things concerning the capacity of a juristic science 
whose method is that prescribed by Ehrlich as "a science of observa- 
tion" or, to put the matter more exactly, whose method is that of 
natural science applied to social facts: 
First, it can give an objectively verified specification of the living 
law and the corresponding positive law norms of the present status quo. 
This is an exceedingly important achievement since it is as essential 
to have objective knowledge concerning the defacto inner social order 
and positive law norms unmixed with the speculative normative pro- 
posals of reformers as it is to have a trustworthy new normative theory. 
Second, there is the possibility that, given an objective determina- 
tion of the living law high frequency behavior of the present status quo 
and assuming a specific new positive law norm, one can determine 
(a) the point at which the introduction of this new norm will result in a 
change of future high frequency social behavior from that of the 
present, and (b) predict the amount of the deviation beyond this 
point. However, before this possibility becomes an actuality, the two 
equations discovered by Underhill Moore must be connected more 
definitely with the deductively formulated assumptions of his theory; 
also the equations must be shown to hold for new objective studies 
using different norms and different social practices from those of Under- 
hill Moore's traffic and parking studies. It is very important that such 
new applications of his method be made. 
Third, legal realism and sociological jurisprudence, even when im- 
plemented with the most powerful and objective scientific methods for 
determining changes of the inner order of society with time, are not 
capable of designating a new norm or of resolving normative legal and 
social disputes. The verbal, subjective, intuitive methods of the earlier 
legal theories, however, are shown by Underhill Moore's research to 
be even more untrustworthy. It follows, therefore, since the domestic 
and international problems of the contemporary world are inescapably 
and increasingly ideological and normative in character, that an 
adequate legal science, while retaining legal realism and sociological 
jurisprudence for the two aforementioned tasks for which they are 
competent, must go beyond both. 
The direction which this advance must take is also clear. First, 
Underhill Moore's conception of a proposition in law as merely the 
bare particular stimulus or particular cue to a response must be modi- 
fied to include the meaningfulness and efficacy in overt behavior of 
ideological factors as required by the neurological and behavioristic, 
scientific findings of Professors McCulloch, Pitts, Rosenblueth, Wiener 
and Bigelow and as applied to the role of ideological factors in human 
behavior and the resultant inner order of society by this writer. This 
change will have the effect of grounding law in a social science which 
places its emphasis upon the "logical-meaningful" relations determin- 
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ing the inner order of society first indicated in the sociology of Professor 
Pitirim A. Sorokin 36 and upon the key importance of the philosophical 
assumptions of any society as emphasized by many contemporary 
anthropologists such as Professor Clyde Kluckhohn.37 In short, the 
theory of the living law as well as the positive law will be grounded in 
the science and philosophy of the world's cultures.38 Such a legal 
science offers the first constructive approach to a new international law 
which will be effective because it has taken into account the many 
underlying living laws of the different peoples, cultures and nations of 
the world. It also offers the first clear envisagement of the problem in- 
volved in even domestic disputes where a conflict of laws is present. 
If not supplemented by other novel methods, however, it will leave 
scientific jurisprudence confronted with a diversity of living law and 
corresponding positive law norms, some of which, at least, conflict 
because they are mutually incompatible.39 It will enable us to formu- 
late ideological, legal and social problems but it will not provide a 
method for resolving them. 
To resolve such problems some method in legal science is required 
which supplements the aforementioned method of the science and 
philosophy of the world's cultures. Underhill Moore's legal science has 
demonstrated that this method is not to be found in a scientific study 
of society or culture. This being the case, only one other source re- 
mains-namely, nature and the philosophy entailed in the verified 
theories of the contemporary science of nature. The increasing role 
of the technological consequences of the verified theory of natural 
science, such as the release of atomic energy, in outmoding the tradi- 
tional living law practices and their corresponding positive law norms 
supports this conclusion. Such developments make it evident that 
adequate new legal and social norms must take into account man's 
contemporary knowledge of nature and its philosophical assumptions 
and implications, as well as his contemporary knowledge of the world's 
societies and their diverse philosophies of culture. It appears, therefore, 
that the legal science of the immediate future must draw upon the 
contemporary philosophy of the social sciences for its statement and 
clarification of the ideological legal and social problems of our time 
and turn to the philosophy of experimentally verified natural science 
for a designation of new social and legal norms or for a resolution of 
disputes involving differences or conflicts between traditional norms. 
36. SOROKIN, SCIENCE, CULTURE AND PERSONALITY: THEIR STRUCTURE AND DYNAM- 
ICS, 42-63, 317-24, 337-40, 635-8 (1947). 
37. Kluckhohn, supra note 24, at 356. 
38. Northrop, Jurisprudence in the Law School Curriculum, 1 J. LEG. ED. 482 (1949); 
NORTHROP, THE LOGIC OF THE SCIENCES AND THE HUMANITIES, C. XXI (1947). 
39. Pound, supra note 24; NORTHROP, THE MEETING OF EAST AND WEST, c. XII 
(1946); NORTHROP, THE LOGIC OF THE SCIENCES AND THE HUMANITIES, CC. XVIII, XX 
(1947). 
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